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CORPORATE CRIME. By Marshall B. Clinard and Peter C. Ye-
ager. New York: Free Press. 1980. Pp. xiii, 386. $16.95. 
The problem of corporate crime1 has attracted increasing schol-
arly attention in recent years. Clinard, a criminologist at the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin, and Yeager, an Assistant Professor of Sociology at 
Yale, have each previously contributed to the development of this 
literature, 2 but unlike their earlier studies, Corporate Crime is di-
rected toward a general audience. Drawing largely from reports of 
corporate misconduct that have appeared in the popular press, par-
ticularly the Wall Street Journal, and from their own statistical study 
of illegal corporate behavior,3 the authors present an overview of the 
many dimensions of corporate criminality. 
Clinard and Yeager say that they were moved to write the book 
because of their perception that "crimes in the suites" have received 
less attention than crimes in the streets (p. x), despite the fact that 
antitrust, tax, and environmental violations, deficiently designed 
products, and corporate fraud and bribery cost the nation billions of 
dollars each year (p. 8). They are concerned, in other words, that 
"corporate crime is generally surrounded by an aura of politeness 
and respectability rarely if ever present in cases of ordinary crime" 
(p. 21). To remove this "aura of politeness," they argue that 
corporate fines should be increased (pp. 124-26), that individuals 
convicted of corporate crimes should be sentenced to jail (pp. 292, 
297-98), and that means should be developed to fix responsibility on 
high corporate officials as well as middle-managers, who currently 
bear the brunt of most enforcement actions (p. 279). But while this 
overall point of view is implicit throughout the book, Clinard and 
Yeager generally refrain from stating it directly in an apparent at-
tempt to preserve at least a semblance of objectivity. The result is a 
work that features relatively discrete, primarily descriptive chapters 
covering, among other things, the growth, influence, and general or-
ganization of the major American corporations, the role of various 
federal agencies in regulating corporate conduct, the general con-
tours of federal antitrust law and policy, and the role and nature of 
business ethics. Other chapters are devoted to particular kinds of 
1. The authors appear to agree with Black's Law .Dictiona,y, which defines corporate crime 
as "[a]ny offense committed by and hence chargeable to a corporation because of [the] activi-
ties of its officers or employees." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 306 (5th ed. 1979). 
2. See M. Clinard & P. Yeager, Corporate Crime: Issues in Research, in CRIMINOLOGY: 
NEW CONCERNS (E. Sagarin ed. 1979); M. CLINARD, P. YEAGER, J. BRISSETTE, D. PETRASHl!K 
& E. HARRIES, ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1979). 
3. M. CLINARD, P. YEAGER, J. BRISSETTE, D. PETRASHEK & E. HARRIES, supra note 2. 
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corporate crime, such as the bribery of foreign government officials 
and illegal domestic campaign contributions. 
But not all of the book is mere description. In perhaps their most 
interesting chapter, Clinard and Yeager go beyond their statistical 
finding that some corporations are significantly more likely than 
others to commit corporate crimes (p. 116), and argue that corporate 
crime is especially prevalent in certain industries, notably the oil, 
automobile, and pharmaceutical industries. Relying on anecdotal 
accounts and various government studies, the authors indict the oil 
companies for monopolizing the energy industry, overcharging con-
sumers during shortages, failing to control emissions, and commit-
ting insufficient funds to exploration and development. Similarly, 
the auto industry is scored for giving inadequate warranties, unfairly 
treating retail dealers, and valuing style over safety; the pharmaceu-
tical industry is criticized for excessive promotion, false advertising, 
improper research and testing techniques, and pursuit of excessive 
profits. The following excerpt typifies the approach that the authors 
use throughout the book to illustrate their arguments: 
Some drugs are heavily promoted even when the manufacturer is 
well aware of possible side effects .... The Richardson-Merrell 
Pharmaceutical Company, for example, promoted the drug MER/29 
during the early 1960s though it knew that the drug had harmful side 
effects . . . . Company salespersons were instructed to suggest to pre-
scribing physicians who complained of such side effects that they were 
caused by other drugs the patient was using. [P. 265.] 
Though perhaps interesting· for their own sake, the scores of exam-
ples that Clinard and Yeager present seem to lead the reader no-
where, beyond the obvious conclusion that abuses should be cor-
rected. 
The authors argue, finally, that although industry's historic in-
ability to control its abuses has led to the promulgation of corrective 
regulations (p. 271 ), corporate crime continues unabated and threat-
ens the future of the capitalist system itself (p. 325). While the au-
thors make very few firm recommendations, they do review and 
discuss the proposals that others have made. These include sugges-
tions that would improve the ethical leadership of top executives, 
strengthen the role of corporate boards of directors, bolster the effec-
tiveness of federal enforcement agencies, create stiffer penalties for 
illegal behavior, and establish a strict federal charter for major cor-
porations. The authors acknowledge the limits of each alternative, 
but they conclude nonetheless that an unspecified "combination" of 
these proposals would help limit illegal corporate behavior (p. 325). 
Clinard and Yeager illustrate the full nature and extent of corpo-
rate crime by drawing together much of the material that has ap-
peared recently in the press and the scholarly journals. 
Unfortunately, however, Corporate Crime provides little more than a 
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superficial introduction to each of the myriad facets of the problem. 
It is thus unlikely to aid anyone who has more than a passing famili-
arity with the subject. Attorneys or policy-makers looking for spe-
cific guidance and thoughtful analysis would do better to consult 
more specialized sources. 4 
4. See, e.g., Coffee, "No Soul To .Damn: No Body to Kick'!· An Unscandalized Inquiry into 
the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICHL. REV. 386 (1981); Coffee, Beyond the Shut-
eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Re-
sponse, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099 (1977); .Developments in the Law- Corporate Crime: Regulating 
Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227 (1979). 
